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AUTHORIZED  PERSONNEL  ONLY:
THE  PATENT  EXHAUSTION  DOCTRINE
AFTER HELFERICH
Jeffrey W. Schmidt*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you recently purchased the latest smartphone.  Then, weeks
later, the manufacturer contacts you and alleges that you are infringing hun-
dreds of patents simply by using the phone.
While this seems ridiculous, technically speaking, you probably are an
infringer.1  Fortunately, courts have devised a defense to infringement, called
the patent exhaustion doctrine, that comes to the rescue.  According to the
Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., this doctrine
“provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all
patent rights to that item.”2  As a result, once a consumer purchases a
smartphone, the patent owners, or its licensees who do the manufacturing,
no longer have any rights over the patents in that phone.3  What about when
a third party engages in some activity that, through interaction with your
smartphone, infringes method patents that are part of the same licensed pat-
ent portfolio as the smartphone patents?  Can the third party take advantage
of your phone’s patent exhaustion to get away with infringing complementary
patent claims that you, as the owner of the phone, could not even practice?
What if the infringing activity was merely the New York Times sending you text
messages alerting you of breaking news, CBS texting you exclusive content
related to your favorite TV show, or J.C. Penney sending you text notifica-
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Ph.D. in Cancer Research,
University of Nebraska Medical Center, 2013; M.B.A., University of Nebraska at Omaha,
2013; B.A. in Biology, Saint John’s University, 2008.  I would like to express my gratitude to
Professor Stephen Yelderman for his helpful comments and guidance throughout the
writing process.  I would also like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for
their hard work and thoughtful edits, and my parents for their endless support and
encouragement.  All errors are my own.
1 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.” (emphasis added)).
2 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).
3 See id.
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tions of their latest giveaway and sweepstakes promotions?4  This is the issue
that recently came up in Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. New York Times Co.5
In its controversial holding, the Federal Circuit expressly held that the patent
exhaustion doctrine only serves to protect so-called “authorized acquirers”
and does not extend to third parties who have not, directly or indirectly,
obtained ownership over the patented device.6  This was after the district
court, also citing Supreme Court precedent, arrived at the opposite conclu-
sion.7  Another major difference between the two courts’ holdings was the
framework with which they determined what patents and claims are
exhausted, and how they are exhausted, in a given device.8
This Note will analyze the framework utilized by the Federal Circuit in
Helferich to assess whether or not it follows Supreme Court precedent along
with the public policies that govern American patent law.  Part I provides a
brief introduction to the patent exhaustion doctrine and the public policies
surrounding the doctrine and patent law in general and discusses important
Supreme Court cases that defined the doctrine.  Part II discusses Helferich in
detail and lays out some of the major differences between the approaches
taken by the Federal Circuit and the one taken by the district court.  Part III
analyzes the framework applied by the Federal Circuit and argues that the
Federal Circuit correctly followed Supreme Court precedent when it focused
on substantial embodiment in the context of separately patentable inventions
and when it set out the express limitation that the patent exhaustion doctrine
only applies to authorized acquirers.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE PATENT EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
An inventor obtains a patent, has the lawful right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling her patented product,9 but nonetheless decides to
sell the product to a consumer.  This is no doubt a standard practice and is at
the heart of patent law policy.10  Yet there is uncertainty as to what sort of
patent enforcement rights a patent owner can lawfully retain on a product
willingly sold to a consumer and thereby released to the public.11  The patent
4 Ryan Nakashima, NYTimes Leads Group Defense in Mobile Patent Suit, USA TODAY
(Aug. 28, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/media/story/2012-08-28/
mobile-patent-suit-New-York-Times/57368374/1.
5 Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
6 Id. at 1301–02.
7 See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971 (N.D. Ill.
2013).
8 Compare Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1298–1311 (the approach taken by the Federal Cir-
cuit), with Helferich, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 976–79 (the approach taken by the district court),
rev’d, 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
9 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
10 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 482 (2008) (“The goal of patent policy is to encourage inventors
to invent, disclose, and disseminate their inventions to the public.”).
11 See generally Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on
Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 583–96 (2013) (discussing the
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exhaustion doctrine seeks to achieve a finely tuned balance between
rewarding a patentee while also preventing the patentee from controlling an
item’s post-sale use and demanding multiple royalties from subsequent own-
ers of the item.12
A. An Overview of the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine
In order to evaluate the metes and bounds of the patent exhaustion doc-
trine, it is important to understand the basis by which our patent system oper-
ates.  Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress
shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . .
Discoveries.”13  The complete authority to issue U.S. patents was vested in
what is today called the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
The patent exhaustion doctrine holds that “a single authorized and
unconditional sale of a patented article terminates all patent rights to that
article.”14  This means that a patentee’s right to exclude15 is terminated.  The
patentee can no longer exclude or restrict any aspect of the purchaser’s use,
possession, or resale of the article.16  Any profit the patentee seeks to make
on the patented device must, therefore, come from the initial sale only.17
The importance of this doctrine is also not new, as it is rooted in more than
uncertainty behind what enforcement rights a patent owner can preserve through use of
post-sale restrictions).
12 Yuichi Watanabe, The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: The Impact of Quanta Computer,
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 273, 275 (2009).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.  To carry out this power, Congress enacted the first
patent statute in 1790.  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).  However, it
was not until 1836 that Congress established an administrative agency tasked with evaluat-
ing and issuing patents—the Patent Office.  Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117
(repealed 1870) (“[T]here shall be established . . . an office to be denominated the Patent
Office . . . .”).
14 Watanabe, supra note 12, at 275 (citing Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553
U.S. 617, 625–26 (2008)).
15 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “[e]very patent shall . . . grant to the
patentee . . . the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States” (emphasis added)).
16 See Server & Casey, supra note 11, at 587 (“[A] patent holder’s right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling its patented product can be waived in whole, through
an unconditional sale . . . .” (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703
(Fed. Cir. 1992))).
17 See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895) (declaring that
patentees “are never entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine” (quoting Mitchell
v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 547 (1872))).
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150 years of American jurisprudence.18  The reasoning behind it is sup-
ported by both practical19 and public policy20 rationales.
Patent exhaustion is but one of three general ways in which a patent
owner can authorize the use of its patent rights.21  The other two include
express licensing and implied licensing.22  The major difference between a
license and a sale, which is what triggers patent exhaustion, is the sale itself.23
The unrestricted sale acts as a firm trigger for exhaustion.  On the other
hand, restrictions that accompany licensing transactions are common, often
times necessary, and are routinely enforced.24  After all, a license is not a
“sale” but rather a “permission . . . to commit some act [or series of acts] that
would otherwise be unlawful.”25  So what happens when a patentee incorpo-
rates conditions on a license to a manufacturer that seeks to impose restric-
tions on the ultimate purchaser?  The law, as was made clear in Motion
Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,26 is that it doesn’t mat-
ter whether the restrictions were imposed directly by the patentee on the
purchaser or if they were imposed through an intermediate licensee—in
either case, the post-sale restriction is invalid under the exhaustion
doctrine.27
18 See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (“And when the machine passes
to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.  It passes
outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress.”).
19 See, e.g., Watanabe, supra note 12, at 276 (claiming that “the [patent exhaustion]
doctrine is necessary from a practical standpoint because the U.S. Patent Act provides that
‘whoever’ without authorization uses, sells or offers to sell a patented article is liable for
patent infringement” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006))).
20 See infra Section I.B.
21 John W. Schlicher, The New Patent Exhaustion Doctrine of Quanta v. LG: What It Means
for Patent Owners, Licensees, and Product Consumers, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 758,
766 (2008).
22 Id.
23 See Eric J. Rogers, The Inexhaustible Right to Exclude Reproduction Doctrine, 14 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 389, 413 (2013) (“The distinction between a sale and license is impor-
tant because an unconditional sale triggers patent exhaustion whereas license conditions
might preserve the patent owner’s ability to enforce patent rights with respect to the sold
item.”).
24 See generally Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion
Doctrine, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 483, 493–95 (2010).
25 License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
26 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
27 Id. The Federal Circuit arguably departed from this precedent in Mallinckrodt, Inc.
v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), when it held that a “single use” notice
attached to a medical device could create a valid license for restricted use with remedies
available through patent infringement. Id. at 709.  However, this holding is believed to
have been overruled by the Supreme Court in Quanta. See Server & Casey, supra note 11,
at 583–96.  Nonetheless, in an en banc opinion decided February 12, 2016, the Federal
Circuit affirmed its holding in Mallinckrodt when it stated, “we adhere to the holding of
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., that a patentee, when selling a patented article subject to
a single-use/no-resale restriction that is lawful and clearly communicated to the purchaser,
does not by that sale give the buyer, or downstream buyers, the resale/reuse authority that
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 5 30-AUG-16 11:58
2016] authorized  personnel  only 2119
Patent exhaustion may seem like a relatively straightforward concept,
but recent technological advances have blurred the lines between not only
what constitutes distinct inventions, but also how, and in what embodiments,
method patents are ultimately practiced through electronic technologies.28
While these issues were ultimately addressed in Helferich, the fundamental
rules and principles that guided the Federal Circuit’s analysis was deeply
rooted in earlier Supreme Court cases, as discussed later in this Note.29
B. Public Policy Rationale
The policy of promoting the advancement of science and technology
was undoubtedly the driving force behind American patent law, as the power
to do so was expressly given to Congress in the Constitution.30  Public policy
has also been a major driving force behind the termination of patent rights
under the patent exhaustion doctrine.31  Historically, patent exhaustion has
served three purposes—(1) to protect consumers from liability for unknow-
ingly infringing patents simply by using the product, (2) to prevent post-sale
restrictions on licensed products, and (3) to ensure patentees are not over-
or under-compensated.32
The first two purposes are intended to protect the purchaser and any
subsequent owner of the patented article from liability or restrictions that
limit their freedom to use the article as they wish.33  Without the first two
protections, commerce would be detrimentally affected.  After all, encourag-
has been expressly denied.”  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., No. 2014-1617,
slip op. at 8 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2016) (en banc) (citing 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
Therefore, it appears that any departure from the Mallinckrodt holding will need to come
from an express overruling from the Supreme Court.
28 The uncertainty as to how to deal with advancing technologies was evidenced by the
differing ways in which the district court and Federal Circuit interpreted the patent claims
related to wireless communication technologies at issue in the Helferich case. See Helferich
Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971 (N.D. Ill. 2013), rev’d, 778
F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
29 See infra Section I.C.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
31 See, e.g., Watanabe, supra note 12, at 275–76 (discussing how the public policy ratio-
nales underlying the patent exhaustion doctrine are necessary from a practical standpoint
and include the goal of preventing post-sale restrictions and double recoveries by
patentees).
32 Lucas Dahlin, Note, When Is a Patent Exhausted? Licensing Patents on a Claim-by-Claim
Basis, 90 CHI. KENT L. REV. 757, 769–70 (2015).
33 See, e.g., Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties
Be Able to Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 445, 453 (“The exhaustion doctrine is also grounded in the policy against restraints
on alienation of chattels.  Once a patent holder authorizes the sale of an article, down-
stream purchasers of the item have a reasonable expectation that they may use the item
free of restrictions from previous owners.”); Watanabe, supra note 12, at 276 (describing
the exhaustion doctrine as being “necessary from a practical standpoint” since, without
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ing commerce is desirable and the ability for a patentee to sue a purchaser
for infringement immediately after the sale would ultimately discourage com-
merce or at the very least significantly increase transaction costs.34  As dis-
cussed below,35 the recent Supreme Court case, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., is said to support this purpose of the patent exhaustion doc-
trine by “providing greater certainty” in protecting consumers and other
downstream players as an article passes down the chain of commerce.36
The public policy behind preventing post-sale restrictions has also been
around since the early cases of the exhaustion doctrine.  In Motion Pictures
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court identified a
post-sale restriction on a patented film projector as giving the patentee “a
potential power for evil over an industry” and therefore held the restriction
to be invalid since “it would be gravely injurious to [the] public interest.”37
An alternative argument against post-sale restrictions is that besides conflict-
ing with patent exhaustion policy, it also conflicts with policies against
restraints on alienation.38  On the other hand, while restraints blindly
imposed on any subsequent acquirer of a patented product, enforceable
through infringement liability, are invalid, contract-based post-sale restric-
tions entered into between an acquirer and an authorized seller may be
enforceable in certain circumstances.39  In any case, the first unrestricted sale
of a patented article exhausts all patent infringement remedies that might
result from an alleged breach of a post-sale restriction while breach of con-
tract remedies may remain,40 assuming the post-sale restriction was part of a
contract between buyer and seller.  The ability to enforce certain contract-
based post-sale restrictions is likely the result of courts finding that the public
exhaustion, “any downstream purchasers using or reselling the patented article would liter-
ally be infringers” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006))).
34 See generally Rinehart, supra note 24, at 503–16 (discussing the interrelation between
transaction costs and patent rights and noting that “[o]nce the patented goods are sold,
transaction costs hinder bargaining between the patent owner and downstream
purchasers”).
35 See infra notes 90–111 and accompanying text.
36 Javier M. Leija, Note, The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine: Patent Holders’ Rights Versus the
Public’s Interest in Using the Invention, 2 PHOENIX L. REV. 163, 186 (2009) (“Quanta’s bright-
line ruling in favor of first-sale patent exhaustion will promote commerce and economic
development by providing greater certainty in transactions among patent holders, licen-
sees, and downstream users.” (citing Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Re-Evaluating Declaratory
Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 975 (2008))).
37 Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917).
38 See, e.g., ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 143 (2012) (noting that “[t]he
doctrine of patent exhaustion also reflects a preference for the free alienability of prop-
erty”); Server & Casey, supra note 11, at 619–26 (discussing and ultimately rejecting the
argument that all contract-based post-sale restrictions contravene the policies against
restraints on alienation).
39 For a discussion of what types of contract-based restrictions may be enforceable, see
Server & Casey, supra note 11, at 626–37.
40 Id. at 637 (arguing “that at least some contract-based post-sale restrictions on a pat-
ented product can be enforced through a breach of contract remedy”).
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policies favoring the freedom to contract outweigh the public policies against
all post-sale restrictions.41  After all, a reason for preventing post-sale restric-
tions in patented articles—ensuring the patentee receives “but one roy-
alty”42—would not be an issue when the buyer and seller are entering into a
contract that is enforceable only among themselves and does not run with
the article.
The third purpose of patent exhaustion—to ensure that patentees are
not over- or under-compensated43—is rooted in a more diverse set of public
policies.44  Perhaps the most frequently cited public policy for this doctrine is
to prevent a patent holder from being able to reap the benefits of an inven-
tion multiple times as it flows through the stream of commerce.45  As
explained by the Supreme Court in Bloomer v. Millinger more than 150 years
ago, a patent holder is “entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine”;
therefore, once the patentee has sold the product or authorized another to
build and sell it, “he has then to that extent parted with his monopoly, and
ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine so sold or so authorized
to be constructed and operated.”46  As a result, this doctrine prevents a pat-
ent holder from licensing or selling its products to manufacturers or retailers
and then later suing, or seeking a royalty from, those who ultimately
purchase the product along with any subsequent owners.47  The policy
behind preventing a patentee from being over-compensated is, therefore,
clear.
The exhaustion doctrine’s policy behind preventing a patentee from
being under-compensated may, however, be less clear.  This might be viewed
as promoting a fine-tuned balance with the policy against over-compensation
by limiting the scope of the exhaustion doctrine.  Take, for instance, a per-
son who developed and patented a new type of mobile phone charger capa-
ble of charging phones five times faster than any other charger currently
available.  She spent years working on this device and has incurred substan-
tial costs along the way that she now hopes to recoup.  However, as soon as
41 See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“Unless the condition violates some other law or policy (in the patent field, notably the
misuse or antitrust law, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co.), private parties retain the free-
dom to contract concerning conditions of sale.” (citing 316 U.S. 241 (1942))).
42 Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863) (declaring that a patentee is “entitled
to but one royalty for a patented machine”).
43 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 769–70.
44 Id. at 774–76 (discussing the third purpose of patent exhaustion in terms of its
effect on economic efficiencies).
45 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale
Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 513 (2011) (“One historical con-
cern that the courts raised in first sale cases was that permitting the patentee to place post-
sale license restrictions on patented goods would entitle the patentee to collect multiple
royalties.  This concern appeared and reappeared in the law of the first sale
doctrine . . . .”).
46 Bloomer, 68 U.S. at 350.
47 Schlicher, supra note 21, at 781.
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she sells one—just one—of the patented chargers, her patent rights are com-
pletely terminated and anyone can now build knock-offs based on her tech-
nology.  If this were the case, she might find it difficult to receive adequate
compensation.  In fact, due to economies of scale, the competitors may even
be able to sell the chargers so cheaply that she may be unable to compete
with them at all.  This policy of protecting a patent’s value was recently exem-
plified in Bowman v. Monsanto Co., where the Supreme Court refused to apply
the exhaustion doctrine on copies of purchased seeds since such an approach
“would provide scant benefit” to the patentee.48  One of the major goals, if
not the major goal, of patent law is to provide an incentive to inventors to
create and disclose new inventions that ultimately benefit the public.49  This
important policy must, therefore, be kept in mind so that the patent exhaus-
tion doctrine does not overstep its bounds and defeat the very purpose of
patent law—“[t]o Promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”50
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine
The Supreme Court first applied the patent exhaustion doctrine in the
mid-nineteenth-century case Bloomer v. McQuewan.51  In McQuewan, the pat-
ent holder sold the right to construct and use patented planing machines to
certain purchasers.52  Then, after Congress passed an act that extended pat-
ent terms by seven years, the patent holder sought to keep the purchasers
from using the machines during this extension period.53  The Court con-
cluded that the purchaser had acquired “the absolute and unlimited right” to
the invention that neither the patent holder nor Congress could dissolve.54
In laying the foundation for the patent exhaustion doctrine, Chief Justice
Taney declared that “when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser,
it is no longer within the limits of the [patent holder’s] monopoly.  It passes
outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of [congressional patent
law].”55
Soon thereafter, the Court was faced with a question as to the limits that
a patent holder can place on a product within the stream of commerce.  In
Adams v. Burke, the Court held that while the licensee of patented coffins was
only authorized to make and sell them within an area of ten miles around
48 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1767 (2013).  The Supreme Court fur-
ther notes, “The exhaustion doctrine is limited to the ‘particular item’ sold to avoid such a
mismatch between invention and reward.” Id.
49 Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917)
(“For more than a century . . . [the patent statute] afforded ample incentive to exertion by
inventive genius . . . [and] under it the greatest inventions of our time, teeming with inven-
tions, were made.”).
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
51 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852).
52 Id. at 548.  A planing machine is used to process lumber.
53 Id. at 547–48.
54 Id. at 553.
55 Id. at 549.
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Boston, there was no longer any restriction on their use once the coffins were
sold by the licensee.56  In other words, a patent holder can limit the way in
which a manufacturer makes, uses, and sells the product, but those rights
over the patented product are completely exhausted once the item is pur-
chased by a consumer, who is free to use it in any way he or she desires.
Importantly, this right exists regardless of the status of the underlying
patent.57
Then, in the early twentieth century, the Court, in a 4-3 decision, briefly
deviated from Adams when it upheld post-sale restrictions in Henry v. A.B.
Dick Co. as being enforceable against a purchaser who has knowledge of the
restrictions.58  In A.B. Dick, the post-sale restriction required purchasers to
use only the patented mimeograph with (non-patented) ink purchased from
the patent holder.59  The patentee then brought a contributory infringement
suit against a third party, who sold its own ink to the owner of the mimeo-
graph despite knowing of the restriction.60  This holding was immediately
met with criticism, including concerns that a patentee might now, through
notice restrictions, be able to “establish a monopoly in unpatented
commodities.”61
The Court apparently shared this concern a year later when it held in
Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell that a patent holder cannot sell a patented article
with an attached notice restricting the price at which it can be resold.62  The
Court did not overrule A.B. Dick, but it distinguished it from the case at issue
by considering the restriction in A.B. Dick a valid license and the restriction
in Bauer a non-license, complete sale.63  Nonetheless, public scrutiny led
56 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873); see also id. at 457 (holding that “in the
class of machines or implements . . . when they are once lawfully made and sold, there is
no restriction on their use to be implied for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or
licensees”).
57 Id. at 455 (“We have repeatedly held that where a person had purchased a patented
machine of the patentee or his assignee, this purchase carried with it the right to the use of
that machine so long as it was capable of use, and that the expiration and renewal of the
patent, whether in favor of the original patentee or of his assignee, did not affect this
right.”).
58 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1912); see also id. at 26 (stating that post-
sale restrictions may be lawfully imposed when the purchaser has “notice that he buys with
only a qualified right of use”).
59 Id. at 11.
60 Id. at 11–12.
61 Note, Control of Patentee Over Unpatented Commodities, 25 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641–43
(1912) (discussing the control that patentees have over unpatented commodities in light
of the A.B. Dick holding).
62 Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1913) (declaring that once “[t]he
right to vend conferred by the patent law has been exercised . . . the added restriction is
beyond the protection and purpose of the [patent] act”).  This holding came just a few
years after the Supreme Court held that a copyright owner cannot impose post-sale price
restrictions on copyrighted books.  Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908).
63 Bauer, 229 U.S. at 14–17.
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Congress to enact the Clayton Act the very next year, in an effort to prohibit
such restrictions through antitrust law.64
Four years later, however, the Court explicitly overruled A.B. Dick in
Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,65 which was
immediately commended as being “a decision of great importance.”66  In
Motion Pictures, the patent holder granted a licensee the right to manufacture
and sell motion picture projectors embodying its patents.67  This license,
however, came with a covenant requiring that the projectors only be used
with motion pictures embodying an entirely separate patent owned by the
same patent holder.68  This license agreement was entered into only three
months after the A.B. Dick decision and was likely an attempt by the patent
holder to take advantage of its newfound freedom to create and enforce post-
sale restrictions.69  A third party, Universal Film Exchange, eventually sold
two films to the owner of the projector, and the patent holder filed suit
against both the projector owner and the third party film provider for
infringement.70  The Court then applied the principles of patent exhaustion
and patent misuse71 to this particular situation.72  The post-sale restriction
was held invalid under the patent misuse doctrine73 and, as a result, could
not prevent exhaustion from occurring.74
In concluding that the post-sale restriction was invalid, the Court held
that the scope of patent protection “must be limited to the invention
described in the claims of [the] patent.”75  Thus, while a patent holder has
the right to restrict the first sale of the item, the patent holder does not have
the right to restrict how, or with what materials, the purchaser chooses to use
64 See, e.g., RICHARD T. HOLZMANN, INFRINGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT RIGHT
152 (1995).
65 Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518–19 (1917)
(declaring that “the decision in Henry v. Dick Co. . . . must be regarded as overruled” since
such post-sale restrictions “would be gravely injurious to [the] public interest”).
66 Frank Y. Gladney, Tying Clause Contract Limiting Use of Patented Article Invalidated—
The Mimeograph Case (Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1) Overruled, 84 CENT. L.J. 335 (1917).
67 Motion Pictures, 243 U.S. at 506.
68 Id. at 506
69 This is suggested at least in part by the Court’s observation that inquiries related to
the permissiveness of post-sale restrictions have been “arising with increasing frequency in
recent years.” Id. at 509.
70 Id. at 507–08.
71 The “patent-misuse doctrine” is defined as “[a]n equitable rule that patentees
should not be allowed to use their patent to effectively broaden the scope of their monop-
oly in restraint of trade or otherwise against the public interest.” Patent-misuse doctrine,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
72 Server & Casey, supra note 11, at 632–33.
73 Id.
74 Ernst, supra note 33, at 452.
75 Motion Pictures, 243 U.S. at 511; see also id. at 512 (explaining that “[t]he grant is of
the exclusive right to use the mechanism to produce the result with any appropriate mate-
rial, and the materials with which the machine is operated are no part of the patented machine or of
the combination which produces the patented result” (emphasis added)).
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the item.  The Court thereby reiterated its firm stance on the patent exhaus-
tion doctrine when it declared that “the right to vend is exhausted by a sin-
gle, unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside the
monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of every restriction which the
vendor may attempt to put upon it.”76  In other words, once the patented
projector was sold, there was nothing anyone could do that would infringe
the patents embodied in the projector.  This included not only the purchaser
of the projector, but also third party suppliers, like Universal.77
The next major issue the Supreme Court faced with the patent exhaus-
tion doctrine was to determine what constituted a sale of a patented article.78
While it may be intuitively straightforward, this issue becomes more complex
when the production of a patented product occurs at multiple layers in the
supply chain with the patent holder attempting to retain control over the
product until its final sale to consumers.
The Court faced such an issue in the antitrust case of United States v.
Univis Lens Co.79  In Univis, the owner of patents related to multifocal lenses
for eyewear licensed a company to manufacture and sell unfinished “blank”
lenses.80  However, under the license, these unfinished lenses could only be
sold to designated wholesalers and finishing retailers who would complete
the patented product by grounding and polishing the lens.81  These whole-
salers and finishing retailers, who purchased the unfinished lenses, were also
under a license from the patent holder that included a royalty provision.82
The Court considered this an unlawful attempt at circumventing the patent
exhaustion doctrine.83  The Court held that once a patent holder has sold
“an uncompleted article” that “embodies essential features of his patented
invention . . . and has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in
conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention.”84  As a result, the patent
holder could impose no restrictions on the purchasing wholesalers and fin-
ishing retailers since the unfinished lenses sold to them embodied essential fea-
tures of the patented invention.85  It made no difference to the Court that the
product did not embody each and every feature of the patented invention at
the time of sale since the patent owner has but once chance to capitalize on a
76 Id. at 516.
77 Id. at 507, 516–19.
78 See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 243.
81 Id. at 243–44.
82 Id. at 244.
83 See id. at 252 (noting that the post-sale restriction “would extend [the patentee’s]
monopoly . . . beyond the fair meaning of the patent statutes and the construction which
has hitherto been given to them”).
84 Id. at 250–51 (emphasis added).
85 Id. at 249.
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legal monopoly under patent law.86  The Court continued, “the authorized
sale of an article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a
relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.”87
Hence, the Court seemed to create new guidance for when to apply the pat-
ent exhaustion doctrine, namely, in situations where there is a question as to
an article’s intended use by the purchaser.88  In this case, the “blank” lenses
were “without utility” until they were ground and polished in accordance
with the patent; therefore, the sale exhausted the full scope of the patent.89
While the patent exhaustion doctrine had been traditionally adjudicated
with respect to apparatus and composition-of-matter claims, there was a lack
of clarity as to whether method claims were also covered by the doctrine.90
Finally, in 2008, the scope of the patent exhaustion doctrine was again at
center stage in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,91 when the
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the patent exhaustion doc-
trine also applies to method patents associated with a sale. Quanta involved
method patents held by LGE for computer technologies, particularly those
used in microprocessors and chipsets.92  LGE licensed its patent portfolio to
Intel, thereby permitting Intel “to ‘make, use, sell (directly or indirectly),
offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of’ its own products practicing the
LGE patents.”93  This agreement, however, was accompanied by a separate
agreement that required Intel to inform its customers that while the products
are being sold under a license by LGE, the license does not allow the pur-
chaser to combine products with any non-Intel product.94  In addition, there
86 Id. at 252 (expressing concern that if the patent holder “were permitted to control
the price at which [the product] could be sold by others he would extend his monopoly . . .
beyond the fair meaning of the patent statutes”).
87 Id. at 249 (citing B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v.
Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 460–61 (1938)).
88 Id. at 250–51 (providing for exhaustion when the patentee “has destined the article
to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent”).
89 Id. at 249.
90 This lack of clarity was created, in large part, through a 1984 Federal Circuit deci-
sion that held method claims to be “inapplicable” to the patent exhaustion doctrine.  Ban-
dag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  This approach
of excluding method claims, however, was highly criticized. See, e.g., John W. Osborne, A
Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J., 643, 678 (2004) (“There is no legitimate basis for
distinguishing between apparatus and method claims in the context of patent exhaustion.
Such a distinction is at odds with Supreme Court precedent . . . .”).
91 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
92 Id. at 623.
93 Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 8, Quanta, 553 U.S. 617 (No. 06-937)).
94 Id. at 623–24.  Interestingly, this restriction bears resemblance to the restriction the
Supreme Court held valid under A.B. Dick.  However, since A.B. Dick was soon after over-
ruled, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court rejected this restriction as being valid,
even if it did relate to methods patents.
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was an added statement that expressly disclaimed any license being granted
to third parties.95
Intel sold products to Quanta, which then combined them with non-
Intel products, and LGE alleged patent infringement against Quanta.96  The
Federal Circuit, in affirming the lower court’s ruling, held that the patent
exhaustion doctrine does not categorically apply to method claims.97  The
Supreme Court, however, disagreed.98  Not only did the Court unanimously
hold that method claims can be exhausted, but it cited Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States99 and Univis100 as two cases in which the Court had previously
exhausted method claims.101  Besides being compelled by stare decisis, the
Court also felt that excluding method claims “would seriously undermine the
exhaustion doctrine.”102  The Court then applied Univis and found that the
Intel microprocessors and chipsets sold to Quanta embodied the essential
features of the LGE patents since “they carry out all the inventive processes
when combined . . . with standard components,” which, in this case, were
non-Intel buses and memory.103  Lastly, the Court found that the sale of
Intel’s products to Quanta was a lawful sale within the context of the patent
exhaustion doctrine since it was, in fact, fully authorized.104  As a result of
Intel’s authorized sale of its microprocessors and chips that embodied the
essential features of the LGE patents, LGE’s method patents were thereby
exhausted and could no longer be used against Quanta.105  The Court, in
concluding its opinion, provided the following guidance:
95 Id.
96 Id. at 624.
97 LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (2006) (affirming the
lower court’s holding that “the sale of a device does not exhaust a patentee’s rights in its
method claims” (citing Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 1999))).
98 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 629–30 (“To the contrary, this Court has repeatedly held that
method patents were exhausted by the sale of an item that embodied the method. . . . We
therefore reject LGE’s argument that method claims, as a category, are never
exhaustible.”).
99 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
100 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
101 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 629; see also FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 143 (“The Court’s mes-
sage echoed loudly and clearly from the opening words of the opinion.  ‘For over 150
years,’ the Court proclaimed, ‘this Court has applied the doctrine of patent exhaustion to
limit the patent rights that survive the initial authorized sale of a patented item.’” (quoting
Quanta, 553 U.S. at 621)).
102 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 629.  The Court further expressed the concern that by categori-
cally excluding method claims from the doctrine, “a patent drafter could shield practically
any patented item from exhaustion.” Id. at 630.
103 Id. at 634.  Importantly, the Supreme Court finds that these standard components
provide for a final step that “is common and noninventive.” Id.
104 Id. at 638; see also id. at 637 (adding that “[n]o conditions limited Intel’s authority to
sell products substantially embodying the patents”).
105 Id. at 638.
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The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent
exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from
invoking patent law to control post-sale use of the article.  Here, LGE
licensed Intel to practice any of its patents and to sell products practicing
those patents.  Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets substantially embodied
the LGE Patents because they had no reasonable noninfringing use and
included all the inventive aspects of the patented methods.  Nothing in the
License Agreement limited Intel’s ability to sell its products practicing the
LGE Patents.  Intel’s authorized sale to Quanta thus took its products
outside the scope of the patent monopoly, and as a result, LGE can no
longer assert its patent rights against Quanta.106
Despite the Court’s seemingly clear language, the Quanta holding was
called “ambiguous”107 and was immediately criticized.108  In particular, there
was uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court had overruled the Federal
Circuit’s holding in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. that post-sale restric-
tions are enforceable and could be remedied through patent infringement
suits if violated by the user.109  Some courts and scholars believe, however,
that Quanta had effectively overruled Mallinckrodt.110  Interestingly, the Fed-
eral Circuit in an en banc decision dated February 12, 2016, affirmed its
holding in Mallinckrodt by stating it is still good law.111  Therefore, it appears
as though overturning Mallinckrodt will require the Supreme Court to use
clear and express language to that effect.
The Supreme Court’s most recent case on patent exhaustion involved a
much different technology—genetic engineering.  In Bowman v. Monsanto
Co., the patented article at issue was a genetically engineered soybean
seed.112  In an effort to avoid purchasing seeds subject to a strict licensing
agreement, a farmer purchased “commodity seeds” from a grain elevator that
he suspected contained some of the patented seeds.113  He then planted the
seeds, grew them under selective conditions that allowed only the patented
106 Id.
107 Ernst, supra note 33, at 457.
108 See Server & Casey, supra note 11, at 579–83 (criticizing the Quanta decision for
endorsing a per se rule for exhaustion absent sufficient policy rationale, for its formalistic
line drawing, and for leaving critical questions unanswered).
109 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also
Server & Casey, supra note 11, at 593 (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court in Quanta deftly
avoided any discussion of Mallinckrodt”).
110 See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575,
585–86 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“[T]his Court is persuaded that Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub
silentio.  The Supreme Court’s broad statement of the law of patent exhaustion simply can-
not be squared with the position that the Quanta holding is limited to its specific facts.”);
Server & Casey, supra note 11, at 593 (“This interpretation supports a conclusion that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt.”).
111 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., No. 2014-1617, slip op. at 8 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 12, 2016) (en banc) (unequivocally declaring that “we adhere to the holding of
Mallinckrodt”).
112 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013).
113 Id. at 1765.
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seeds to grow into crops, and then saved the newly produced seeds for subse-
quent harvests.114  The Court, in a unanimous opinion, rejected the farmer’s
patent exhaustion defense.115  While the exhaustion doctrine would allow
the farmer to consume or resell the patented seeds he purchased from the
grain elevator, it would not allow the farmer to produce any additional copies
of the patented soybean seeds.116  In refusing to extend the exhaustion doc-
trine in this manner, the Court explained that “if simple copying were a pro-
tected use, a patent would plummet in value after the first sale of the first
item containing the invention.”117  The current Supreme Court, therefore,
understands the importance of defining the scope of the exhaustion doctrine
and is cautious toward extending the doctrine into unchartered territory due
to the potential risks it may cause to the market.
While these cases may seem to cover the wide spectrum of patent
exhaustion doctrine jurisprudence, they do not address the issue whether,
and to what extent, this doctrine also applies to third parties who are not
themselves acquirers of the sold article.  As the next Part will demonstrate,
this is a major issue that was recently addressed by the Federal Circuit.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S APPROACH IN HELFERICH
Quanta seemed to suggest that each and every patent right associated
with an item is exhausted upon its authorized sale.  Then, in 2015, six years
after the Quanta decision, the Federal Circuit held in Helferich Patent Licens-
ing, LLC v. New York Times Co.118 that patent exhaustion is limited by the
bounds of claimed “invention”—no matter how it is drafted—and that it only
applies to so-called “authorized acquirers” and does not separately protect
third party infringers.119 Helferich was immediately met with criticism that
challenged, among other things, whether it abides by Supreme Court
precedent.120
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1769 (concluding that “[p]atent exhaustion provides no haven for [the
farmer’s] conduct”).
116 Id. at 1766.  This patent law principle bears striking resemblance to the Supreme
Court’s view in the famous copyright case Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, where the Court con-
sidered the author’s “right to multiply copies of his work” to be perhaps “the main purpose
of the copyright statutes.”  210 U.S. 339, 347 (1908).  The Court seems to adopt a similar
approach with respect to patent rights in Monsanto.
117 Monsanto, 133 S. Ct. at 1768.
118 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Samuel F. Ernst, The Federal Circuit’s New “Authorized Acquirer” Restriction on
Patent Exhaustion, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb. 16, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/
02/authorized-restriction-exhaustion.html (“The panel opinion is directly contrary to
Supreme Court precedent and represents a fundamental misunderstanding of one of the
core purposes of the exhaustion doctrine.”).
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A. Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. New York Times Co.
In Helferich, the patent holder, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC
(“Helferich”), held more than thirty patents related to wireless-communica-
tion technologies that were conceptually divided into “handset claims” and
“content claims.”121  The handset claims were directed to the mobile handset
itself (i.e., the cell phone) along with the user’s actions in “receiving and/or
requesting certain content.”122  The content claims, in contrast, were largely
directed toward actions taken by third party content providers.123  A news
content provider, for instance, “might send a subscriber a message contain-
ing the headline of a news article along with website-location information
that permits the subscriber, upon choosing to click a hyperlink, to gain access
to the complete article.”124  As a result, those susceptible to potential
infringement of handset claims and content claims are, for the most part,
entirely separate parties.
Helferich licensed its patent portfolio—both its handset claims and con-
tent claims—to most, if not all, the mobile handset manufacturers in the
United States.125  These licenses, however, made an effort to expressly
reserve the right to enforce its content claims against third party content
providers.126  The handsets subsequently entered the stream of commerce
when the licensees sold them to consumers, and Helferich filed suit against
third party content providers, including the New York Times, CBS, and J.C.
Penney, alleging patent infringement of its content claims.127  The district
court, finding non-infringement, held that once the patent licensee sells a
handset embodying the licensed patents, the entire patent is exhausted.128
The court reasoned that since Helferich licensed both handset and content
claims to the manufacturers, then both sets of patents—handset and con-
tent—were exhausted.  Yet, under Univis, the handsets must embody the
“essential features” of each patented invention in order to apply.129  Cer-
tainly this holds true for the handset claims, but whether it also holds true for
121 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1295.  The patents at issue were U.S. Patent Nos. 7,280,838;
7,499,716; 7,835,757; 8,107,601; 8,116,741; 8,134,450; and 7,155,241. Id.  Only the ‘838
and ‘716 patents contained both handset and content claims. Id.  The ‘757, ‘601, ‘741,
‘450, and ‘241 patents exclusively contain content claims. See id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (acknowledging “the fact that it is content providers, not possessors of handsets,
that practice [the content claims]”).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1296.
126 Id. at 1297.
127 Id. at 1295.
128 Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971, 980 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (applying Quanta to the present case and concluding that “once a licensee sells a
mobile device that partially embodies HPL’s patent, even if the device does not completely
practice HPL’s patent, that patent is exhausted.  The doctrine of patent exhaustion gov-
erns the exhaustion of a patent, not the exhaustion of individual claims.” (emphases omit-
ted)), rev’d, 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
129 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942).
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the content claims is less clear.  Nonetheless, the district court considered
this requirement to be satisfied since “[t]he handset devices have the capabil-
ity to receive content from content providers, and the [content] patents all
require devices capable of receiving content or messages.”130  Therefore, in
the court’s view, the fact that the handset was necessary for practicing the
content claims was the sufficient embodiment of essential features needed to
satisfy the test.
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed on appeal and held that the
authorized sale of the handset to a user does not exhaust the patent holder’s
right to enforce content claims against third parties.131  While some scholars
consider this a questionable narrowing of the patent exhaustion doctrine,132
the Federal Circuit instead considered this to be nothing more than a refusal
to “expand the doctrine into difficult new territory unmapped by lines
drawn, or even sketched, by Congress.”133  In reaching this conclusion, the
court cited Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co.134 for
the proposition that “the [patent exhaustion] doctrine would not apply in
circumstances where the alleged infringement involved distinct, though
related, validly patented inventions.”135  It is, therefore, apparent that the
court largely based its ruling on its conclusion that the handset claims and
the content claims do, in fact, represent distinct inventions rather than a
single invention.  In addition, the court pointed out that the doctrine has
only been applied in situations where “an authorized acquirer was using the
same invention by infringing the asserted claims”136 and that neither the
court nor either party were aware of any Supreme Court case that found
exhaustion to occur in the absence of “this common feature.”137
Ultimately, there are two major differences between the approaches
taken by the district court and the Federal Circuit in construing the scope
and applicability of the patent exhaustion doctrine.  The first difference con-
cerns how broadly (or narrowly) the court finds claims to be exhausted upon
the sale of an item.  The second difference concerns whether the court views
the patent exhaustion doctrine as a defense that a third party non-acquirer
can, in fact, raise.  The district court took a broad approach on the first dif-
130 Helferich, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
131 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1311.
132 See, e.g., Ernst, supra note 120.
133 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1305.
134 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
135 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1303 (citing Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrap-
ping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 435 (1894)).
136 Id. at 1302 (emphasis added).
137 Id.  While “authorized acquirer” may seem to be a new term adopted by the Federal
Circuit, it should be viewed as merely a coined term used to express the Supreme Court’s
view that the patent exhaustion doctrine applies to the acquirer of the product when there
is an authorized sale of the product to the acquirer. See, e.g., Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
The purchaser, who can then assert the patent exhaustion defense, is an acquirer through
an authorized sale—an “authorized acquirer,” as the Federal Circuit puts it.
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ference and concluded that “the handset devices sold sufficiently embody [all
of the] patents-in-suit” since “the patents all require devices capable of receiv-
ing content or messages.”138  The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, took a
more narrow approach with regard to the substantial embodiment test.  It
viewed the situation at hand as “rais[ing] an exhaustion question in the con-
text of multiple related and separately patentable inventions.”139  After estab-
lishing that the content claims and handset claims were separate inventions,
the Federal Circuit laid out the strict rule, based on Supreme Court prece-
dent including Quanta, that the patent exhaustion defense only applies to
what it calls “authorized acquirer[s].”140  Therefore, since the content prov-
iders were not authorized acquirers of the content claims invention, the
exhaustion defense does not apply and they are, as a result, liable for
infringement.141  The district court did not address the “authorized
acquirer” issue and, instead, treated the authorized sale of an item as a pre-
requisite for whether its patents are exhausted, which in the court’s view
would include all parties, rather than in what context and for whom.142
B. Contrasting the District Court and Federal Circuit Approaches
Whether or not the Federal Circuit correctly decided this case is up for
debate and might even reach the Supreme Court.143  If it does, the Court will
likely hear arguments from both sides that ultimately boil down to at least
three categories of inquiry.  First, there is the issue whether the scope of the
patent exhaustion doctrine is defined in terms of distinct inventions, or,
rather, extends to each and every claim encompassing an entire (loosely
defined) patented system.  Second, even if the patent exhaustion doctrine is
strictly limited to distinct inventions, there is an issue as to whether the fact
that a second invention strictly requires the first invention in order to prac-
tice its claims results in the merger of both inventions into a single exhausted
set of claims.  And third, and perhaps most important, is the issue whether
the patent exhaustion defense only protects “authorized acquirers” from lia-
bility or if, in fact, it is a defense available to non-acquiring third parties.  The
district court and the Federal Circuit each took opposing views on these
issues, as discussed below.
138 Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 (N.D.
Ill. 2013), rev’d, 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
139 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1301.
140 Id. at 1302.
141 See id. at 1311.
142 See Helferich, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (“Once the handset manufacturers sell the
handsets which embody [Helferich’s] patents, [Helferich’s] patents are exhausted as to all
third parties, including Defendants.”).
143 See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent
Law, 3 IP THEORY 62 (2013).  The potential for a Supreme Court grant of certiorari, or at
least its consideration of granting certiorari, in the Helferich case is particularly strong due
to the Supreme Court’s recent interest in patent cases. Id. at 63 (“Starting in around 2000,
the Supreme Court became active, if not even hyperactive, in patent law.”).
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1. Application of the Quanta Test
Inherent in almost any case regarding application of a doctrine is the
need for defining scope.  Sometimes it involves the scope of the doctrine in
general while other times it relates to the scope of a single element.  In the
case of Helferich, the Federal Circuit began by limiting the breadth of patent
exhaustion to patents associated with the “invention[ ]” actually purchased
by the authorized acquirer.144  The court then proceeded to determine that
the handset claims comprised one invention while the content claims com-
prised a separate and distinct, albeit related, invention.145  As discussed ear-
lier, the Quanta test for “substantial embodiment” requires that the patented
invention (1) includes “all the inventive aspects of the patented methods,”
and (2) has “no reasonable noninfringing use.”146
It remains unclear, however, whether the Supreme Court intended this
two-part test to be a generally applicable test for all future cases, or whether it
was merely a narrow framework for deciding the Quanta case at hand with
the intention that future cases be decided on a more liberal basis.  After all,
the Supreme Court has a tendency to reject the adoption of a single test in
favor of a more liberal and flexible approach.147
The district court took a different approach from the Federal Circuit in
deciding which claims to include and exclude from exhaustion.  In its view,
the proper scope relates not to the boundary of an “invention” as drafted,
but rather includes all claims that are practiced, in whole or in part, by the
sold device irrespective of classification.148  In other words, if the allegedly
infringing claims are part of the same claimed system as the handheld device,
then those claims should be exhausted to the same extent as the handheld
device’s patents.149  Rather than distinguish among “inventions,” the court
lumped all claims together since Helferich licensed its entire patent portfolio
to the handset manufacturers.150  The court then applied the Quanta test
and found that since the handsets “are capable of receiving content” in
accordance with the content claims, all of the patent claims—content and
handset alike—are substantially embodied in the handsets and thereby
144 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1303.
145 Id. at 1309.
146 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
147 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (2010) (noting that “[t]he Court
of Appeals [for the Federal Circuit] incorrectly concluded that this Court has endorsed the
machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test” before ultimately rejecting the Federal
Circuit’s approach by holding that, while “useful and important,” “[t]he machine-or-trans-
formation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible
‘process’”).
148 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1298 (“The [district] court did not focus on the particulars
of any of Helferich’s claims, whether handset or content claims.”).
149 See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (concluding that “the handset devices sold sufficiently embody the patents-
in-suit”), rev’d, 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
150 See id. (“[E]very handset device has been licensed to practice [Helferich’s] patents;
ergo, no handset device can infringe [Helferich’s] patents.”).
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exhausted.151  A clear difference in the courts’ approaches, therefore, has to
do with degree of embodiment.
2. Dependency of the Content Claims on the Handset
The district court adopted the view that the Quanta “substantial embodi-
ment” test is met whenever the claims at issue require use of the sold arti-
cle.152  The Federal Circuit, however, criticized and rejected this view.153
The court did not necessarily foreclose the possibility of exhaustion based on
a dependency theory, but instead concluded that at a minimum, there must
be “infringement of the asserted claims by authorized acquirers.”154  Since
the handset users, or “authorized acquirers,” do not practice any of the steps
of the content claims, then, in the Federal Circuit’s view, there can be no
patent exhaustion of the content claims toward third parties.155
3. The “Authorized Acquirer” Limitation
The major, and perhaps most controversial, holding the Federal Circuit
made was that the patent exhaustion doctrine only applies to what it calls
“authorized acquirers”156 and does not extend to third parties.  This is a strict
standard—there is no flexible approach taken here.157  The court reasons
that this is the approach that has always been taken with regards to doc-
trine.158  This holding was met with harsh criticism.159  The argument
against the Federal Circuit’s approach is a mix of both interpretation and
151 Id. at 978–79.
152 Id. at 978.  The court, in justifying its reasoning, states that “[t]he handset devices
have the capability to receive content from content providers, and the patents all require
devices capable of receiving content or messages.” Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 7,155,241
(filed Feb. 7, 2005)).
153 Helferich, 778 F.3d. at 1308–11.
154 Id. at 1302.
155 See id. at 1300 (pointing out that neither the district court nor the defendants “con-
tend that handset possessors practice any of the asserted claims”); see also id. at 1311 (“We
see no sound basis for expanding [the] exhaustion doctrine to hold that authorized sales
to persons practicing the handset claims exhaust the patentee’s rights to enforce the
asserted content claims against different persons.”).
156 The Federal Circuit states, “We use ‘authorized acquirers’ to refer to those who
acquire title to the article at issue from the patentee or from a licensee authorized to sell,
and those who acquire possession and operational control, as by lease, from such a per-
son.” Id. at 1297 n.1 (citing LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., 734 F.3d 1361, 1374–77
(Fed. Cir. 2013); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917)).
157 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1301 (“Exhaustion protects an authorized acquirer’s freedom
from the legal restrictions imposed by the patent statute.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at
1302 (“The [exhaustion] doctrine has never applied unless, at a minimum, the patentee’s
allegations of infringement . . . entail infringement of the asserted claims by authorized
acquirers . . . .” (emphasis added)).
158 Id. at 1302 (noting that the patent exhaustion doctrine “has never applied” absent
infringement by an “authorized acquirer[ ]” (emphasis added)).
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public policy.  It is argued, for instance, that Motion Pictures represents a case
where the Supreme Court used patent exhaustion to shield third parties
from liability for patent infringement.160  After all, it was a third party sup-
plier, Universal, that was shielded from liability in Motion Pictures by the
Supreme Court’s holding.161  This might suggest that the Federal Circuit’s
holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine only applies to “authorized
acquirers” is an overly restrictive interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.
The district court, after all, does not view the exhaustion doctrine as a
defense restricted to authorized acquirers, but instead as a doctrine that pre-
cludes liability for anyone who might happen to infringe.162
Part III addresses each of these issues and argues that the Federal Cir-
cuit’s approach to Helferich accords with Supreme Court precedent and pub-
lic policy.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
IN HELFERICH
The Federal Circuit correctly refused to extend the patent exhaustion
doctrine beyond its traditional reach.  Not only did the court follow Supreme
Court precedent, but this approach also more closely coincides with public
policy rationales that have guided our patent system since it was first estab-
lished by our Constitution almost two and a half centuries ago.163
The patent exhaustion doctrine does not now, nor has it ever, provided
across-the-board exhaustion of all patent claims in situations where the
claims represent separate and distinct inventions.164  This applies with even
more force when the separate and distinct inventions are also practiced by
separate and distinct groups of users, as in the case of Helferich.165  The
Helferich ruling by the Federal Circuit is, therefore, not a narrowing of the
doctrine, but rather a decision to restrain the doctrine from an unprece-
dented and potentially dangerous broadening.  Further, the argument that
159 See Ernst, supra note 120 (calling the opinion “directly contrary to Supreme Court
precedent” by “represent[ing] a fundamental misunderstanding of one of the core pur-
poses of the exhaustion doctrine”).
160 Id.
161 Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 507.
162 See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971, 979
(N.D. Ill. 2013), (“Once the handset manufacturers sell the handsets which embody
[Helferich’s] patents, [Helferich’s] patents are exhausted as to all third parties . . . .” rev’d,
778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
163 See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
(discussing the development of U.S. patent law and the public policies underlying it).
164 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1301 (concluding that “the exhaustion defense . . . does not
bar Helferich’s claims” since this case involves “multiple related and separately patentable
inventions” and because the exhaustion doctrine “has never been applied to terminate
patent rights in such complementary activities or goods in these circumstances”).
165 Id. (“The situation, to simplify, involves a single inventor’s coming up with two
inventions . . . one invention to be practiced by one group of users, the other invention by
another group . . . .”).
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Helferich establishes a new right for a patent holder to collect “an additional
royalty”166 is misguided since it is not an additional royalty on the same
invention, but instead represents a separate royalty on a separate and distinct
invention, which is a common practice courts have historically allowed.167
The conclusions reached by the Federal Circuit hold true because (1) the
scope of patent exhaustion must be limited to the confines of distinct inven-
tions, (2) the article sold must embody all the inventive aspects of the alleg-
edly infringed patent and there must be infringement by an authorized
acquirer, and (3) the patent exhaustion defense is applicable only to author-
ized acquirers and is not independently applicable to third party infringers.
A. The Scope of Patent Exhaustion Must Be Limited to the Confines
of Distinct Inventions
The Supreme Court considers that “a patentee’s rights extend only to
the claimed combination of elements, and no further.”168  While patent
exhaustion may not seem like it falls into the category of patentee rights, the
two principles are, for all intents and purposes, quite interrelated.  A patent
grants the patentee “[t]he right to exclude others from making, using, market-
ing, selling, offering for sale, or importing an invention for a specified
period.”169  The patent exhaustion doctrine, on the other hand, provides an
avenue by which this right to exclude is exhausted and can no longer be
legally enforced, thereby acting as a defense to infringement.170  It therefore
seems only logical that the scope of patent exhaustion should not exceed the
scope of the patent rights that are being exhausted.
The Supreme Court has, perhaps implicitly, adopted a relatively straight-
forward test for delineating the scope of patent exhaustion that involves, first,
determining what constitutes a distinct “invention” and, second, determining
what inventions are “substantially embodied” in the article sold.171  Only pat-
ents that are substantially embodied in the distinct invention are exhausted
upon the sale of the article, while patents that fail the substantial embodi-
ment test are not exhausted.172
166 Ernst, supra note 120.
167 See generally Osborne, supra note 90, at 668–73.
168 Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014).
169 Patent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added); see also 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “[e]very patent shall . . . grant to the paten-
tee . . . the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States” (emphasis added)).
170 See, e.g., ExcelStor Tech., Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co., 541 F.3d 1373, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (reaffirming that “patent exhaustion is a defense to patent infringement,
not a cause of action” (citing Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1334–36 (Fed. Cir.
2006))).
171 Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1301, 1308–10
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
172 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 634–35 (2008).
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This is precisely the approach taken by the Federal Circuit.  While the
Supreme Court has not expressly stated that the first step in a patent exhaus-
tion analysis is to separate out distinct inventions, this is implied.  In Quanta,
the Court provided an example of when, in a situation with two distinct
inventions (For simplicity, the Court referred to them as “patent A” and “pat-
ent B”), the exhaustion of patent A would and would not exhaust patent
B.173  While the critical part of this determination is the substantial embodi-
ment test,174 it must first be determined what constitutes the invention at
issue—are A and B separate inventions or are they actually one single inven-
tion?  Then, and only then, can it be determined what claims are, and are
not, substantially embodied in the invention.  The Supreme Court’s analysis
in Quanta supports this approach.
In construing what constitutes a distinct invention, the Federal Circuit in
Helferich correctly focused this assessment on the patents themselves rather
than on their contemplated uses or the potentially restrained value of the
article sold.175  There is a longstanding presumption that each patent and
each claim within a patent represent an invention that is patentably distinct
from any other.176  This does not mean, however, that each patent can neces-
sarily be practiced independently of other patents.  This is especially true for
smartphones, which, due to their complexity and rapidly advancing technol-
ogy, have as many as a quarter million patents claiming some aspect of their
design or operation.177
The Helferich patents are, in fact, multiple inventions divided into two
distinct and separate classes of inventions—“content claims” and “patent
claims.”  The “content claims” of Helferich represent multiple patented inven-
tions that, as a whole, operate to provide “systems and methods for storing
and updating information of various types (content) and sending it to hand-
sets.”178  Perhaps the biggest difference between these two claim sets—the
difference the court relies on heavily for its determination that these consti-
tute distinct inventions—is that they are practiced by entirely different
173 Id.
174 The substantial embodiment test is a two-part test for finding exhaustion of method
patents based on whether the article sold (1) “had no reasonable non-infringing use” and
(2) “included all the inventive aspects of the patented methods.”  Id. at 638; see also infra
notes 206–09 and accompanying text.
175 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1305 (rejecting the content providers’ argument that the
bounds of the patent exhaustion doctrine should be “based on a practical inquiry into
whether enforcement would constrain authorized acquirers’ use of the articles they
acquired”).
176 See Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 (1935).
177 Steve Lohr, Apple-Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/apple-samsung-case-shows-
smartphone-as-lawsuit-magnet.html.
178 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1295.
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groups.179  The handset claims constitute an invention practiced by the con-
sumer who acquired the handset, while the content claims constitute an
invention practiced by a non-purchasing and non-acquiring third party.180
The argument that these distinct inventions should nonetheless be treated as
one invention for exhaustion purposes is unsound and without precedent.
It is true that two of Helferich’s patents at issue—U.S. Patent Nos.
7,280,838 and 7,499,716—do contain both handset claims and content
claims; however, this alone is insufficient to justify merging both sets of
claims into one inventive category for exhaustion purposes.181  An argument
that the presence of both sets of claims in a single patent proves that the
claims as a whole represent a single invention is without merit for at least two
reasons.  First, the Supreme Court long ago recognized that each claim in a
patent represents its own invention that stands or falls independent of the
other claims.182  Second, and perhaps most important, there is no mandatory
requirement for separating distinct or independent inventions from a single
patent application.  The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP),183
published by the PTO, describes this process—called “restriction”—and the
situations in which it is, and is not, proper.184  This is an entirely discretion-
ary requirement made by the patent examiner during prosecution.185  In
other words, each patent may be required to consist of only one invention if
the examiner so chooses.  There is nothing to prevent an examiner from
allowing claims related to multiple inventions to issue from the same patent.
In fact, while separating inventions into distinct patents is discretionary, the
179 Id. at 1301 (“The situation, to simplify, involves a single inventor’s coming up with
two inventions presumed to be separately patentable, one invention to be practiced by one group
of users, the other invention by another group . . . .” (emphasis added)).
180 See Section III.C below for a deeper analysis of this distinction.
181 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1295.  The other five patents allegedly infringed were solely
comprised of content claims. Id.
182 See Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 (1935)
(“[E]ach claim must stand or fall, as itself sufficiently defining invention, independently of
the others.” (citing Carlton v. Bokee, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 463, 472 (1873); Smith v. Snow,
294 U.S. 1 (1935); T.H. Symington Co. v. Nat’l Malleable Castings Co., 250 U.S. 383, 385
(1919); Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301, 319 (1909); Russell v.
Place, 94 U.S. 606, 609 (1876); 1 WALKER ON PATENTS § 220 (6th ed. 1929))); see also
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (stating
that the scope of patent protection, which would therefore include exhaustion, “must be
limited to the invention described in the claims of [the] patent” (citing R.R. Co. v. Mellon,
104 U.S. 112, 118 (1881))).
183 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (9th ed.
2015) [hereinafter MPEP].
184 Id. §§ 803–803.01.  In order for an examiner to properly restrict inventions, the
MPEP lays out two requirements.  First, “[t]he inventions must be independent or distinct
as claimed,” and second, “[t]here would be a serious burden on the examiner if restriction
is not required.” Id. § 803 (citations omitted).
185 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012) (“If two or more independent and distinct inventions are
claimed in one application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one
of the inventions.” (emphasis added)).
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Patent Office strictly prohibits, for public interest reasons, the granting of
two patents for the same invention.186  As a result, an examiner unsure as to
whether a patent contains one or two distinct “inventions” is more likely to
side with keeping them together in the same patent.  After all, as mentioned,
restriction is discretionary while issuing two patents on the same invention is
prohibited.
Moving forward, if an examiner determines that two inventions are pat-
entably distinct, there is uncertainty as to what extent that determination
should also govern the boundaries of what claims are exhausted.187  The Fed-
eral Circuit in Helferich seemed to suggest it does play at least some role by
“confirm[ing] the independence or distinctiveness of the separated
claims.”188  After all, each of the Helferich patents arose from a single origi-
nal application, but the PTO ultimately issued at least seventeen restrictions
that broke up the application into “independent and distinct” sets of inven-
tions.189  It turns out, however, that the restriction requirement exists more
for procedural reasons—namely avoiding undue burden on the examiner—
than for substance.190  It is therefore plausible that the PTO may have found
that the ‘838 and ‘716 patents contain two independent inventions but none-
theless declined to impose a restriction because it would not seriously burden
examiners to review the claims together.
186 MPEP, supra note 183, § 803.01 (“It still remains important from the standpoint of
the public interest that no requirement be made which might result in the issuance of two
patents for the same invention.” (citing id. § 804.01)).  The policy rationale behind this is
to prevent inventors from extending the life of their patent monopoly by filing a second
patent on the same invention—a prohibited practice termed “double patenting.”
187 Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1310–11 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that the restriction requirements imposed by the PTO do “pro-
vide some fuel for each side’s argument”).
188 Id. at 1310 (citing MPEP, supra note 183, §§ 802.01, 803).
189 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC at 14, Helferich Patent
Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293 (2014) (No. 2014-1196) [hereinafter Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant].
190 While there is nothing inherently wrong, or against patent law policy, with issuing a
patent that contains multiple inventions, such a practice would afford applicants a way to
avoid paying separate fees for each invention. See Jon W. Henry, Understanding & Simplify-
ing Restriction Practice Under 35 USC § 121, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 17, 66 (2004)
(“It is obvious that including claims to many related inventions with separate features in a
single application may reduce the filing fees, issue fees, and maintenance fees that would
be required for separate applications and patents, as well as reduce other fees, such as fees
for extensions of time, during prosecution.”).  A second reason, which is also procedural, is
that a restriction avoids placing an overwhelming burden on the examiner. Id. (explaining
that examiners may issue a restriction requirement “to prevent being overwhelmed by the
search and examination of the many related inventions”).  Of these two main reasons,
avoiding “a serious burden” seems to be the principal reason and, in fact, such a burden is
actually required in order for an examiner to impose a restriction requirement.  MPEP,
supra note 183, § 803.  Therefore, not only is a restriction among inventions discretionary
on an examiner, but it also requires there to be “a serious burden on the examiner if
restriction is not required.” Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 26 30-AUG-16 11:58
2140 notre dame law review [vol. 91:5
In contrast, that the Helferich patents were generally divided into sepa-
rate patents consisting of either handset claims or content claims suggests
they are, in fact, separate categories of inventions.  It also makes sense from a
cost and efficiency standpoint for an applicant to file multiple sets of claims
in as few patent applications as possible.191  The risk of this strategy, however,
as was made abundantly clear in the Helferich case, is that courts might con-
strue patent exhaustion doctrine to exhaust more than just the claims that
were part of the sold invention.192  Ultimately, however, the Federal Circuit
emphasized that due to the discretionary nature of restrictions, such a deter-
mination was not dispositive, but nonetheless weighed against the argument
that the two sets of claims—handset and content—could properly be com-
bined into one.193
The practice of separating claims within a single issued patent is also not
new.194  More than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court was faced with an issue
“of considerable importance”—“whether a patentee can split up his patent
into as many different parts as there are claims.”195  The Court concluded
that individual claims within a patent could be separately licensed; however,
they could not be separately assigned.196  Therefore, the practice of licensing
out a patent on a claim-by-claim basis is a common occurrence and often
provides for a more efficient allocation in the marketplace than an all-or-
nothing licensing requirement.197  This is precisely the strategy that Helfer-
ich followed as it licensed out its content claims to more than 150 content
providers and licensed its handset claims to handset manufacturers such as
Apple, Samsung, LGE, and HTC.198
Moreover, there is a longstanding presumption in patent prosecu-
tion,199 litigation,200 and licensing matters201 that the focus on patent rights
rest in the individual claims rather than how they are organized in patents.
191 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 767–68 (“In the normal course of business, in an effort to
minimize costs, patent holders often file as many distinct claims in a single patent as possi-
ble, rather than spreading them out over multiple patents.” (citing Robert Platt Bell,
Restriction Requirements, ROBERT PLATT BELL ARTICLES (Oct. 21, 2007, 10:26 AM), http://
robertplattbell.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2007-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-
max=2008-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=28)).
192 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 767 (pointing out that despite the benefits of filing as
many claims together as possible, “Helferich could have saved itself a lot of headaches by
simply filing all of its claims as separate patent applications”).
193 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1310–11.
194 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 772 (describing Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully & Jeffery
Manufacturing Co., 144 U.S. 248 (1892), as only one of “several circumstances” in which
“the courts have made clear that each claim of a patent should be treated separately”).
195 Pope, 144 U.S. at 250.
196 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 772 (citing Pope, 144 U.S. at 252).
197 See id. at 769–77.
198 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 189, at 14–15.
199 See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 183, § 706 (specifying that applications are reviewed on
an individual claim-by-claim and providing guidance for the rejection of claims).
200 See, e.g., Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487
(1935).
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The Supreme Court in Quanta also recently voiced its concern over adopting
an approach that would exhaust patents based simply on how they are
drafted.202  By extending exhaustion to every claim of a patent—irrespective
of what each claim entails—it would overturn the presumption that claims,
rather than patents, are the operative unit for delineating patent rights.203
This would give rise to a number of concerns as it would defy settled expecta-
tions, create uncertainty as to the exhaustion of pre-existing patents, create
inefficiencies,204 and encourage the same strategic patent drafting that the
Supreme Court in Quanta warned against.205  Namely, distinct inventions
would have to be claimed in separate patent applications to avoid exhaustion
of both, through the authorized sale of one.  Yet, in the end, whether two
related but distinct inventions are claimed in the same patent or are split up
into two patents, the result would be the same—the scope of exhaustion
would be limited to distinct inventions.  Therefore, there is no sufficient justi-
fication for upending the longstanding practice of limiting exhaustion to
independent inventions regardless of how their claims are drafted.
B. Patent Exhaustion of a Method Under Quanta Requires an Article to Embody
Each Inventive Aspect of the Patented Method and Requires
Infringement by the Authorized Acquirer
The Federal Circuit correctly concluded that the substantial embodi-
ment test from Quanta requires not only substantial embodiment of “all the
inventive aspects” of the content claims, but it also requires infringement of
the content claims by an authorized acquirer.  Neither condition was met in
Helferich for the reasons that follow.
The Supreme Court provided a two-part test in Quanta whereby a
method patent that was only partially practiced in a sold article could none-
theless be exhausted.  While the Court did not provide a rigid test or give
much guidance for future application of the test,206 it seemed to suggest that
a method patent is substantially embodied in an article, and thereby
exhausted by its sale, when two conditions are met.  First, the article must
include “all the inventive aspects of the patented methods,” and second, the
201 See, e.g., Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully & Jeffery Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 248, 252 (1892)
(holding that individual claims could be separately licensed after noting that, at least in the
context of licensing, “it is sometimes said that each claim of a patent is a separate patent”).
202 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 629–30 (2008) (noting that
“[t]his case illustrates the danger of allowing such an end-run around exhaustion” since “a
patent drafter could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion”).
203 See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 194–98; infra notes 234–39.
205 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 629–30.
206 See, e.g., Thomas G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the Supreme Court’s Decision in
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 49 IDEA 517, 546 (2009) (“[T]he Court
may have used [the two factor] terminology simply because [it] . . . accurately described
the facts of [the] particular case, without necessarily intending to announce the control-
ling standard for all such cases in the future.”); Watanabe, supra note 12, at 283–84.
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article must have “no reasonable noninfringing use.”207  It remains to be
seen, however, whether just one of the two factors can be sufficient or
whether substantial embodiment does, in fact, require both.208  It turns out
that the Federal Circuit ultimately did not have to decide this open question
in Helferich.  After assessing each factor individually, the court concluded that
neither factor supported a finding of substantial embodiment.209
As to the first factor, the court looked to its recent decision in LifeScan v.
Shasta210 for guidance.  To satisfy the “inventive aspects” factor, the court
looks to “whether the additional steps needed to complete the invention
from the product are themselves ‘inventive’ or ‘noninventive.’”211  The Fed-
eral Circuit found that none of the inventive aspects of the content claims
exist in either the handset or the handset claims.212  While this specific analy-
sis was not based on Supreme Court precedent, it was also not contradictory
to any of its precedent since the Court has not had to decide this issue to
such a narrow extent.  After all, the Court’s Quanta decision, arguably the
Supreme Court case that most closely resembles the issues in Helferich, left
unanswered the question as to “how to distinguish between creative and non-
creative decision-making” in deciding substantial embodiment.213  Nonethe-
less, the approach taken by the Federal Circuit coincides nicely with the well-
established notion of inventiveness.  For instance, one way to tease out the
“inventive aspects” of an invention is to determine which aspects of the inven-
tion distinguish it from the prior art by adding something that is “new, use-
ful, and nonobvious”—the three basic requirements of patentability.214  In
the case of Helferich, do these aspects of the content claims lie more in the
handset itself or in the hands of a third party?  Fortunately, the court avoided
a difficult and potentially ambiguous balancing test since the content provid-
ers “identified no basis . . . for concluding that for the asserted content
claims, the patented advance over prior art lay in the handsets.”215  The con-
tent claims and handset claims, according to the court, both have their “own
inventiveness.”216
207 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638.
208 See Watanabe, supra note 12, at 284 (acknowledging the lack of clarity as to whether
one or both of the Quanta factors must be met).
209 Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“If the two questions were to be transposed into this context, they would not help
defendants’ case for exhaustion.”).
210 LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
211 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1309 (quoting LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1368).
212 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1309 (“[I]f the inquiry compares handset claims and content
claims, we cannot find that either set wholly contains the invention found in the other.
Each has its own inventiveness . . . .”).
213 Watanabe, supra note 12, at 285.
214 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)
(“The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the
creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances . . . .” (emphasis added)).
215 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1309.
216 Id.
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Having determined that the first part of the Quanta two-part test was not
met, the Federal Circuit could have ended the inquiry but instead decided to
move forward.  As to the second factor, the court, again citing LifeScan, inter-
preted Quanta as requiring that any alleged noninfringing use of the pat-
ented invention must be “both ‘reasonable and intended’ by the patentee.”217
This is despite the fact that the Supreme Court, in Quanta, only speaks to
whether the article has a reasonable noninfringing use, and does not specify
whether it should be from the perspective of the patentee, the licensee, the
purchaser, or merely in the abstract.218  Such an attempt to judge whether an
article has no noninfringing use from an “intent” perspective has the poten-
tial to create “ambiguity and uncertainty” in the application of the patent
exhaustion doctrine.219  For this reason, a more “sensible and convenient”
test has been advocated that calls for an interpretation based on the verbiage
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c),220 which sets forth the test for contributory infringe-
ment.  In fact, the Federal Circuit itself acknowledged that Quanta’s “reason-
able noninfringing use” inquiry “echoes language in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).”221
This language is said to be “very well suited” for application in the patent
exhaustion doctrine.222  In any event, the Federal Circuit’s requirement that
a noninfringing use be not only reasonable, but also “‘intended’ by the pat-
entee”223 is a questionable interpretation of Quanta.
Whether the Supreme Court will ultimately support the Federal Circuit’s
approach of reading into Quanta an intent element on the part of the paten-
tee remains to be seen.224  In any case, the result of the second factor for
substantial embodiment in Helferich would nonetheless remain the same.
Whether the test is for a product having “substantial noninfringing use” or a
217 Id. (quoting LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., 734 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2013)).
218 See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).  The only
mention of “reasonable and intended use” arose when the court discussed Univis, noting
that in Univis, “exhaustion was triggered by the sale of the lens blanks because their only
reasonable and intended use was to practice the patent and because they ‘embodie[d]
essential features of [the] patented invention.’” Id. at 631 (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942)).
219 See William P. Skladony, Commentary on Select Patent Exhaustion Principles in Light of the
LG Electronics Cases, 47 IDEA 235, 276–77 (2007).
220 Id. at 278.
221 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1309.  The statute provides for contributory infringement to
anyone who sells a component that is intended for use in the infringement of a combina-
tion patent unless it is “a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
222 Skladony, supra note 219, at 277 (describing the relationship between § 271(c) and
patent exhaustion).
223 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1309 (emphasis omitted) (quoting LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v.
Shasta Techs., 734 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
224 While the outcome of this case does not appear to depend at all on whether or not
there is an intent element in the second Quanta factor, it is plausible that a future case
arising in district court or the Federal Circuit would turn on such a determination and
may, therefore, elicit Supreme Court review.
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noninfringing use that is “both reasonable and intended by the patentee,”
the court reached a conclusion sufficient to satisfy either verbiage.  In fact,
the language the court used appears to be an attempt to satisfy both tests.225
The court stated, “Helferich submitted evidence . . . that there is a substantial,
reasonable, intended use [for the handset claims226] other than one that plays a
role in content providers’ infringement of the asserted content claims.”227
Examples of these uses includes the handset’s airplane mode and peer-to-
peer sharing of links to content on a third-party website.228
The Federal Circuit appropriately rejected the “surprising” approach
taken by the district court that seemed to misconstrue the test set forth in
Quanta.229  The district court seemed to base its substantial embodiment
analysis not on the framework utilized in Quanta or Univis, but rather on an
overly inclusive and expansive approach.230  Rather than looking to whether
the handset device includes “all the inventive aspects of the patented [con-
tent claim] methods,”231 the district court merely looked to whether the
“devices have the capability to receive content from content providers.”232
Whether a device actually encompasses a distinct set of patented claims is very
different from whether the device is merely capable of practicing it.233  Surely a
handset device that is merely capable of practicing the content claims does
not mean it is sold with the claims already included in the device or is other-
wise capable of practice by the acquirer.  In addition, it is evident that a sub-
stantial amount of the content claims at issue consisted of elements practiced
225 Alternatively, this may have been a reflection of the uncertainty of what precisely the
Quanta framework requires, along with the fact that the evidence was so strong that any
reasonable application of the Quanta framework would likely result in the court’s
conclusion.
226 In this context, “handset claims” refers to the handset claims embodied within the
consumer’s handset.
227 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1309 (emphasis added).  The court further concluded that
preserving the patent holder’s rights in the content claims does not “render the licenses to
the handset industry essentially worthless.” Id. at 1310 (quoting Brief for Defendants-
Appellees at 2, Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (No. 2014-1196)).
228 Id. at 1309–10.
229 See Dahlin, supra note 32, at 770–72.
230 See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978, 980
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (adopting the approach that an entire patent is exhausted upon the sale of
an item that only “partially embodies” the patent and that it does not matter whether
certain claims within the patent are distinct from others), rev’d, 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2015); see also generally Dahlin, supra note 32.
231 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
232 Helferich, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (emphasis added).
233 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1300 (discussing how the “receiving capability of handsets”
differs from the actual receipt of content, i.e., the practicing of content claims, by the
handset users).
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by content providers that were not just “standard components.”234  While two
of the patents at issue did contain handset claims undoubtedly practiced in
the handset claims, applying such a “de minimis” approach to patent exhaus-
tion would also risk undermining the practice of licensing patents claim-by-
claim.235  This approach may also result in economic inefficiencies, includ-
ing market hold-up and free riding.236
If licensing a single claim exhausts the entire patent for owners and
third parties alike, then companies will forego pursuing a licensing agree-
ment and will wait until another company licenses some aspect of the inven-
tion.237  In such a scenario, it would be hard to imagine any reasonable
company choosing to pay a royalty when it would mean that their competi-
tors could then practice the entire patent royalty- and obligation-free.  This
would decrease incentive to license, and licenses would significantly
undercompensate the patentee.238  More importantly, this would square
directly against the principal goal of our patent system—“[t]o Promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts.”239
Similarly, the district court seemed to misinterpret the Supreme Court’s
approach to the second Quanta factor.  Rather than asking whether there is
“no reasonable noninfringing use” for the device,240 the district court instead
focused on whether the device’s “only and intended use is to be finished
under the terms of the patent.”241  Even under this interpretation of Quanta,
the court should nonetheless have found that this factor was not met.  First,
in both Quanta and Univis, the “finishing” consisted of “the application of
common processes or the addition of standard parts”242 rather than inventive
aspects.  Even the defendants (content providers) in Helferich were unable to
provide evidence that the inventive aspects of the content claims lie in the
234 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 771; cf. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 633 (“[T]he incomplete article
substantially embodies the patent because the only step necessary to practice the patent is
the . . . addition of standard parts.”).
235 See Dahlin, supra note 32, at 771 (expressing the concern that, under such an
approach, “licensing even a single claim from a patent will exhaust the entire patent”).
236 See, e.g., id. at 776–77 (discussing the ways in which the district court’s approach in
Helferich could cause market hold-up); Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of the Scope
of Patent Infringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 213–20
(2007) (discussing the issue of free-riding in secondary markets).
237 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 776 (noting that “companies would have incentives to sim-
ply wait out the process” if this were the case).
238 The Supreme Court has embraced a strong position against expanding the patent
exhaustion doctrine in a way that “would effectively protect the invention for just a single
sale” since such a practice “would result in less incentive for innovation than Congress
wanted.”  Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766–68 (2013).
239 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Dahlin, supra note 32, at 776 (claiming that such
an expanded patent exhaustion doctrine would cause negative effects on society by
“keep[ing] inventions off the market”).
240 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
241 Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (quoting Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628), rev’d, 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
242 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 633 (emphases added).
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handsets.243  It is therefore clear that even this approach does not support
the exhaustion of the content claims.  Second, it is a stretch to say that the
only use for a handset is for third-party content providers to send you con-
tent.  After all, Helferich provided evidence of other substantial uses for its
handset claims other than working together with its distinctly inventive con-
tent claims.244  Additionally, the exhaustion of all claims present within a
single patent is inconsistent with the notion that more than one independent
and distinct invention may be present in a single patent, as discussed ear-
lier,245 along with Supreme Court dicta that stressed the importance of not
applying the patent exhaustion doctrine in situations involving distinct
inventions.246
As mentioned previously,247 there is a logical relationship between
exhaustion and the contributory infringement statute § 271(c).  The
Supreme Court in Univis set forth a test248 that provides for exhaustion in
situations where there might otherwise be a claim for contributory infringe-
ment.  For instance, if a patent holder sells an incomplete article to a manu-
facturer who then finishes production and sells it to an end user who directly
infringes the patent, the manufacturer would face liability under the plain
reading of § 271(c).249  The Univis test for exhaustion of incomplete articles,
however, closely tracks the language of § 271(c), thereby preventing such an
infringement claim against the manufacturer.250  This can also be justified
based on equitable considerations.251
243 Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
244 Id. at 1309–10.
245 See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
246 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1303 (citing Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrap-
ping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 435 (1894)).
247 See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text.
248 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
249 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012) (“Whoever . . . sells . . . a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition . . . knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be lia-
ble as a contributory infringer.”).
250 See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1942).
251 Put simply, a seller of a component that has no reasonable noninfringing use can be
liable for contributory infringement by “set[ting] in motion a chain of events that are
destined to lead to infringement.”  Skladony, supra note 219, at 277.  Likewise, a patentee
who sells, or authorizes the sale, of her patented article is similarly “the prime mover or
architect of the events that inevitably lead to infringement” and should, therefore, be
deemed to have exhausted any patent rights that could be asserted against the purchaser.
Id. As a result, exhaustion, in a sense, prevents a patentee from contributing toward the
infringement of her own patent and then reaping the benefit through an infringement
claim.
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However, contributory infringement is only one of two modes of indirect
infringement.252  The other mode is induced infringement.253  In contrast to
the much lengthier contributory infringement statute,254 induced infringe-
ment simply reads, “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.”255  The same equitable rationale underlying con-
tributory infringement of an apparatus claim256 might also advocate for
preventing a patentee from causing the induced infringement of a method
claim and then reaping the benefit through a § 271(b) infringement claim.
It would, after all, make sense to apply patent exhaustion to induced infringe-
ment.  Just as a patent holder, through the Univis test, cannot sell an incom-
plete article to a manufacturer and then sue the manufacturer for
contributory infringement after selling the item to an end user,257 it would
make sense that a patent holder cannot sell, for example, an electronic
device, to a retailer and then sue the retailer for induced infringement when
the device is turned on by the end user and method patents are infringed.
Consider the following hypothetical.  John patents a method for repel-
ling mosquitoes using a specific sound wave unnoticeable to humans and
pets but effective at repelling over ninety-nine percent of mosquitoes for up
to 100 feet away from the source.  Realizing the desperate need for such an
invention, John develops a small but attractive-looking box that emits the
sound waves, which he calls the “Mosquito Repellant Radio.”  He then sells
several of the devices to a local sporting goods store owned and operated by
Jane.  Lo and behold, the Mosquito Repellant Radio flies off the shelves.
Jack, one of the purchasers, is overjoyed by how well the method works to
repel mosquitoes and contacts John to inform him of the success.  John, in
response, accuses Jack of infringing his patented method and accuses Jane of
induced infringement.  Should courts employ the patent exhaustion doctrine
to provide Jane with a defense similar to how courts would apply the doctrine
in situations resembling contributory infringement?  After all, in both cases
the patent holder is selling an article embodying the patent to a reseller with
the expectation that the article would be resold to an end user.  It could
reasonably be argued that the same underlying rationale that exhausts the
patentee’s rights in asserting infringement258 should be applied to both
forms of indirect infringement.  How the courts would handle this issue in
the explicit context of patent exhaustion remains to be seen.
Nonetheless, it seems, based on Quanta, that exhaustion would protect
Jane in this situation.  While the Supreme Court in Quanta did not elaborate
252 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (induced infringement); id. § 271(c) (contributory
infringement).
253 See id. § 271(b).
254 See id. § 271(c).
255 Id. § 271(b).
256 See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
257 See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
258 See Skladony, supra note 219, at 277.
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much on its test for substantial embodiment,259 what the Court did make
clear is that method claims can be exhausted by the authorized sale of an
article substantially embodying those claims.260  The Court did not articulate,
however, the modes by which exhaustion of method patents could occur.
What the mosquito repellant hypothetical suggests, however, is that Jane’s
inducement of John’s method claims should also trigger exhaustion of the
claims.  By selling the Mosquito Repellant Radio to Jack, who practiced the
patented method claims by turning on the radio, Jane induced the infringe-
ment of method claims under § 271(b).261  But Jane’s inducement should
logically exhaust the method claims.  After all, Jane’s sale of the radio to Jack
was authorized, and the radio substantially embodied the patented method
claims “because [the radio] had no reasonable noninfringing use and
included all the inventive aspects of the patented methods.”262  Therefore,
just as a situation involving contributory infringement exhausts method
claims through sale of an incomplete article,263 situations involving induced
infringement should similarly exhaust method claims, for example, through
sale of a finished product.
C. The Patent Exhaustion Defense Is Only Available to Authorized Acquirers Who
Infringe the Patented Claims and Has Never Been Independently
Available to Third Parties
Finally, the Federal Circuit rightly held that the patent exhaustion doc-
trine is, and has always been, limited to protecting only authorized acquirers
from liability.264  As discussed previously,265 patent exhaustion has histori-
cally served the purposes of protecting consumers from liability: preventing
post-sale restrictions on a product and a patentee’s over- or under-compensa-
tion.266  The public policy rationale behind these purposes has already been
discussed.267  For now, it is important to recognize that each of these pur-
poses is ultimately intended to benefit the authorized acquirer of the arti-
cle.268  The argument that the authorized acquirer limitation is “a wholly
259 See, e.g., Watanabe, supra note 12, at 283–84.
260 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
261 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
262 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638.
263 See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
264 Support for the Federal Circuit’s approach to limiting the patent exhaustion doc-
trine to situations where the authorized acquirer directly infringed the patent is found in
numerous Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Quanta, 553 U.S. 617; Univis, 316 U.S. 241;
Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Keeler v.
Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895); Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated
Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894); Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355 (1893); Adams
v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340 (1863).
265 See supra Section I.B.
266 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 769–70.
267 See supra Section I.B.
268 Although it should be noted that that the third purpose—preventing the over- and
under-compensation of a patentee—is also intended to benefit the patentee. See supra
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novel restriction” merely invented by the Federal Circuit269 is also without
merit.270  The Supreme Court has consistently referred to the doctrine only
in the context of protecting “the purchaser, or any subsequent owner” of the
article.271  The exhaustion doctrine was never intended to protect third par-
ties who have not lawfully acquired possession of the article.272  The doctrine
has always revolved around a “sale,” which is itself a bargain between the
patentee, or its licensee, and the acquirer, which sale includes the right of
the acquirer to use the article freely, without any liability for infringement.
This highlights at least one reason why a non-acquiring third party, who has
provided no consideration whatsoever, should not be afforded the same free-
dom from liability as the authorized acquirer.  Interestingly, in Helferich,
exhaustion of the content claims would only protect non-acquiring third par-
ties and would provide no protection whatsoever to the authorized
acquirers.273  The content claims, after all, represent an entirely different
invention from the one acquired by the purchaser.  Importantly, it is the
third-party content provider and not the user of a handset that has the ability
to actually practice, and thereby infringe, the content claims.274  Therefore,
expanding the exhaustion doctrine to include third parties would fail to
serve even the most basic purpose of the doctrine— to protect consumers from
liability simply by using the product they purchased.
Even the Supreme Court cases that may appear to provide third party
protection only do so indirectly as a result of direct infringement by the
notes 43–50 and accompanying text.  However, in this situation, the patentee is not as
much benefitting from the doctrine itself, but rather from a limitation of the doctrine’s
scope. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
269 Ernst, supra note 120 (calling the Federal Circuit’s holding as imposing “a wholly
novel restriction on the exhaustion doctrine”).
270 See DONALD S. CHISUM, 5-16 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[2][a][7] (2015) (“All past
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases applied [patent] exhaustion in situations in
which a patent owner’s infringement assertion in a suit depended on an authorized
acquirer directly infringing the asserted claims.”).
271 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013); see also, e.g., Quanta Com-
put., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (applying the exhaustion doctrine to
protect Quanta—the authorized purchaser of patented microprocessors and chipsets—
from liability); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1942) (applying the
exhaustion doctrine in the context of an antitrust case for protecting retailers and whole-
salers following their authorized purchases of lens blanks).
272 See, e.g., Dahlin, supra note 32, at 769 (“Expanding the defense of patent exhaustion
to protect non-licensing, non-purchasing third parties, such as the New York Times, from
claims of direct infringement conflicts with the historical reasoning behind the doctrine.”).
273 See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1295 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (pointing out that “it is content providers, not possessors of handsets, that prac-
tice” the allegedly infringed content claims); id. at 1301–02 (“But the [exhaustion] doc-
trine’s protection against infringement allegations has, apparently, always remained within
a limit that reflects the core notion that exhaustion lifts legal restrictions on an authorized
acquirer.”).
274 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 770 (“[I]n fact, there was nothing that an end-user could
do with his purchased cell phone to infringe upon the content claims that Helferich was
asserting against the New York Times.”).
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authorized acquirer.  Technically speaking, Motion Pictures275 provided liabil-
ity protection to a third party through an application of exhaustion.  The
problem with this conclusion, however, is that the third party was merely a
secondary beneficiary to the exhaustion of patent rights that applied to the
purchaser of the projector.  Since the post-sale restriction on the projector
was found invalid through patent misuse, exhaustion applied and the owner
of the projector was free to use any sort of film.  Therefore, a third party
could not be found liable for contributing toward any infringement.276
Finally, restricting the patent exhaustion defense to authorized acquirers
does not provide the patentee with an avenue for sending forth its article
into the chain of commerce only to extract multiple royalties along the way.
This is an often-argued reason for allowing exhaustion; however, the policy
against multiple royalties has never served as the basis for invoking patent
exhaustion.277  Nonetheless, Helferich does nothing to disturb this policy.
Some patents consist of multiple inventions or multiple embodiments and it
is sometimes impractical for a patentee and licensee to bargain for the entire
scope of patent rights.  By selectively licensing out patent rights, a patentee
can better achieve the economic goal of “mak[ing] sure that a licensee is not
paying for more or less intellectual property rights than his product will util-
ize.”278  Since mobile phone users are unable to practice the content claims,
seeking a royalty from them for the content claims invention seems inappro-
priate.  Rather, it would be more efficient, and better for consumers, to seek
a royalty from content providers who actually practice the content claims.
After all, content providers like the New York Times and CBS are presumably
practicing the content claims as part of their business plan in hopes of reap-
ing a financial reward from it.  In fact, more than 150 content providers
already entered into licensing agreements with Helferich for its content
claims.279
Likewise, restricting a single patent to but one royalty, regardless of how
many inventions it might encompass, poses substantial risks to the market.280
For instance, consider a patent that is broad enough that half of its embodi-
ments could be practiced in one industry and the other half in another
industry, without any overlap.  Imagine if the patentee were forced to license
both sets of embodiments to just one party.  This would likely result in the
patentee receiving less compensation, since only half of the patent is of any
use to any one party.  To avoid this, inventors would be forced to try ex ante
275 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
276 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972) (“[I]t is estab-
lished that there can be no contributory infringement without the fact or intention of a
direct infringement.”).
277 Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1308 (declaring that the policy against “double recover[ies]”
through royalties “has never served as an independent test for determining whether
exhaustion applies” (quoting Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 227, at 28)).
278 Dahlin, supra note 32, at 774.
279 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 189, at 14–15.
280 See, e.g., Dahlin, supra note 32, at 774–77.
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to split up their patent into multiple ones, even if efficiency and logic would
disfavor such an approach.  Furthermore, such an approach may result in less
patent protection in the end due to issues related to double patenting and
obviousness rejections.  It would also run counter to the Supreme Court’s
stance that application of the patent exhaustion doctrine should not turn on
how the patent was drafted.281
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit provided new guidance in Helferich for when and to
whom the patent exhaustion doctrine would apply.  In the past, there was no
real need to distinguish between authorized acquirers and third parties when
it came to application of the exhaustion doctrine.  This is because, histori-
cally, there would be no infringement—and therefore no need to raise the
patent exhaustion defense—unless the patented article had been acquired,
one way or another, by the alleged infringer.282 Helferich, on the other hand,
is typical of the contemporary digital age, in which the line between distinct
inventions is blurred and the manner by which an invention is practiced is
complex.
Fortunately, the Federal Circuit looked to Supreme Court precedent on
the issue and laid out a framework in Helferich that will help resolve future
cases in a much more consistent and accurate manner as digital technologies
continue to advance and method patents become increasingly more com-
plex.  This framework can be conceptually divided into three steps.  First, it
must be determined whether the claims allegedly infringed represent a single
invention separate and distinct from the invention(s) associated with the arti-
cle sold.283  While patent exhaustion is applicable whether the claims
represent a single or multiple inventions, this step serves as a prerequisite for
application of the Quanta test.  Second, it must be determined whether the
allegedly infringed invention is substantially embodied in the article sold
based on the two-part Quanta test.284  Particularly important at this step is
that each of the “inventive aspects” of the allegedly infringed invention must
281 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 629–30 (2008); see also supra
notes 199–205 and accompanying text.
282 Infringement occurs when anyone “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).  Therefore, in order to infringe a
patent prior to the contemporary digital age, possession of an article that embodies the
patent, or at least some of the patented steps, was logically required.  Today, however, it is
possible to “use” a patented invention without ever possessing an article that embodies it.
See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 1293, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (noting that “it is content providers, not possessors of handsets, that practice [the
patented content claims]”).
283 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1301–05 (discussing how the patents at issue involve “multi-
ple related and separately patentable inventions”).
284 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638 (setting forth a two-part test for substantial embodiment of
method patents based on whether the article sold (1) “had no reasonable noninfringing
use” and (2) “included all the inventive aspects of the patented methods”).
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be embodied in the article sold.285  Third, and perhaps most important, the
authorized acquirer of the article must directly infringe the allegedly
infringed invention.286  If steps two and three are satisfied under Helferich,
then the authorized acquirer is shielded from infringement liability, as are any
third-party contributors.287  In Helferich, since neither step two nor three was
satisfied, the patent exhaustion defense did not afford the third party con-
tent providers with any sort of protection from liability.288
As this Note has argued, the Helferich framework represents an appropri-
ate approach for dealing with increasingly complex technology and is sup-
ported by Supreme Court precedent and public policy rationale.  Finally, in
light of Helferich, there are at least four things a patentee should keep in
mind when pursuing licensing arrangements.  First, if a patentee wants to
license out the manufacture of the product, the patentee should be careful
about which patents and claims to include in the license.  Much of the dis-
pute in Helferich arose due to Helferich licensing both sets of claims to the
manufacturer, rather than just the handset claims.289  This opened the door
to allegations that the two sets of claims were one and the same and that
Helferich was seeking to recover “multiple royalties” on a single invention.290
Second, a patentee can maintain control over who becomes an authorized
acquirer by authorizing the licensee to sell the patented product only to cer-
tain parties.291  However, the unrestricted resale of products might lessen
this control.  Third, using language in the licensing agreement that expressly
disclaims any grant of patent rights to third parties may help prevent third-
party infringers from seeking protection under the alternative theory of
implied license.292  Finally, despite beliefs that Quanta effectively overruled
285 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1309.
286 See id. at 1302 (concluding that the patent exhaustion doctrine is only applicable
when there is “an assertion that an authorized acquirer was using the same invention by
infringing the asserted claims” and that “[n]either the parties nor [the court] have identi-
fied any case from the Supreme Court that has found exhaustion without this common
feature”).
287 See, e.g., Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917); supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
288 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1301–02, 1308–11 (finding that the authorized acquirers
did not infringe the asserted claims and that there lacked substantial embodiment of the
content claims as a basis for ultimately rejecting the exhaustion defense).
289 The district court seemed to base its finding of exhaustion at least in part on the
fact that Helferich licensed both handset and content claims to the handset manufactur-
ers. See Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 965 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (“Once [Helferich] licensed its patent portfolio to, for example, Motorola, down-
stream consumers and third-party users of Motorola devices employing [Helferich’s] pat-
ents cannot be found to be infringing.” (citing Quanta 553 U.S. at 630)), rev’d, 778 F.3d
1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
290 Helferich, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
291 See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 637–38 (concluding that Quanta was authorized to acquire
the patented microprocessors and chipsets since the patentee placed no conditions or
restraints on who the licensee could sell the products to).
292 See Helferich, 778 F.3d at 1297.
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the Mallinckrodt holding that permits a patentee to place restrictions on the
reuse/resale of a sold article,293 thereby preventing exhaustion, the Federal
Circuit in its February 2016 decision reaffirmed its Mallinckrodt holding as
alive and well.294  Therefore, at least until the Supreme Court expressly
decides otherwise, these restrictions may provide a means by which a paten-
tee could retain some level of control over an article’s use or resale notwith-
standing the exhaustion doctrine.
293 See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
294 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., No. 2014-1617, slip op. at 8 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 12, 2016) (en banc).
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